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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELIZABETH A. DESCHLER, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
FIREMAN'S FUND AMERICAN LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Case No. 18035 
THE UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF THE POLICY EX-
CLUSION WAS INTENDED TO ELIMINATE COVERAGE 
FOR THIS RISK. 
The principal argument posed in respondent's brief is 
that the plaintiff is entitled to recover policy benefits 
because the aerial navigation exclusion is ambiguous in its 
intent and must therefore be construed against the defendant 
insurer. Brief of Respondent, pp. 8-9, 15. 
There is nothing in the record suggesting Judge Taylor 
found that the exclusion is ambiguous. The Summary Judgment 
does not specify the basis for the lower court's ruling, nor 
any supporting reasoning. The plaintiff's repeated 
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references to alleged grounds and reasons for the judgment 
notwithstanding, the most that can be implied from the deci-
sion of the lower court is that Judge Taylor found the water 
ski kite was not a •device for aerial navigation.• Brief of 
Respondent, pp. 1, 6. 
The exclusion is not ambiguous. The plaintiff's argument 
attempts to obscure the clear and specific intent of this 
type of exclusion under the guise of interpretation. General 
rules of construction dictate that in the case of ambiguity, 
the language is to be construed against the draftsman. How-
ever, ambiguity is not to be presumed and the rule is not 
applied simply because one party contends an alternative con-
struction is reasonable. 
[T]hat rule has no application unless there is some 
genuine ambiguity or uncertainty in the language 
upon which reasonable minds may differ as to the 
meaning. That requirement is not satisfied because 
a party may get a different meaning by placing a 
forced or strained construction on it in accordance 
with his interest. The test to be applied is: 
would the meaning be plain to a person of ordinary 
intelligence and understanding, viewing the matter 
fairly and reasonably, in accordance with the usual 
and natural meaning of the wordsl, and in the 
light of existing circumstances, including the pur-
pose of the policy. If so, a special rule of con-
struction is obviously unnecessary. 
Auto Lease Company v. Central Mutual Ins. co., 7 Utah 2d 336, 
325 P.2d 264, 266 (1958) [Citations omitted]. Accord, 
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Barnes, 285 F.2d 299, 301 
(9th Cir. 1960). 
-2-
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Aviation and aerial navigation exclusions are commonly 
used throughout the insurance industry. They are drafted 
with the specific intent of limiting the insurer's liability 
for those extra risks of death ordinarily associated with the 
dangers of aerial flight. Green v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. 
Co., 144 F.2d 55, 57 (1st Cir. 1944). 
It is no secret that insurance companies generally 
seek to limit their liability under life insurance 
policies for injuries or deaths resulting from the 
insured's connection with certain enumerated activi-
ties. The common risks which accident and death 
policies exclude are death by suicide, Couch on In-
surance Second §§ 40:4, 41:195; death or disability 
caused by certain diseases or infections, Id. 
§ 41:398; death or injury suffered during war or 
military service, Id. § 41:696; and death or injury 
connected with aviation, Id. § 41:541; Annotations 
at 155 A.L.R. 1026 and 17--X.L.R. 2d 1041. The aver-
age individual should not be surprised, therefore, 
to find that these very same exclusions do in fact 
exist in the accident coverage portion of the certi-
ficate issued to Dan Ayres [the deceased]. Included 
among these common exclusions is the aviation clause 
at issue in this case. 
These types of provisos, which exclude avia-
tion-related risks from coverage, are not only com-
mon, but their usual and ordinary purpose has been 
characterized by the courts. . . . "[the insurance 
company] intended to insure most people who fly but 
not those whose profession or hobby is connected 
with the actual flying of planes and who are there-
fore normally subject to more repeated risks and 
risks more directly within their own control." 
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Barnes, 285 F.2d 
at 300 .••• 
Ayres v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 602 F.2d 1309, 1313 
(9th Cir. 1979) [Emphasis added]. 
-~-
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The clear intent of the provision at issue in this case 
is to exclude the dangerous risks associated with all air 
travel except commercial passenger transportation. 
EXCLUSIONS 
The policy does not cover any loss, fatal or non-
fatal caused by or resulting from (1) injuries sus-
tained in consequence of riding as a passenger or 
otherwise in any vehicle or device for aerial navi-
gation, except as a passenger for transportation 
only, and not as a pilot or crew member, in any air-
craft which has been certified as airworthy by the 
appropriate authority of the country of its registry 
and which is not owned, leased or operated by the 
Policyholder; 
The exclusion is, admittedly, broad in scope. It is in-
tended to cover all hobby or recreational airborne travel. 
The exclusion could have specifically named every type of 
device for aerial navigation known to man including water ski 
kites. The lack of that sort of specificity does not equate 
with ambiguity. This same argument was considered and re-
jected by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Cabell v. World 
Service Ins. Co., 599 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Tex.Civ.App. 1980). 
In Cabell, the appellate court affirmed the lower court's 
judgment in favor of the defendant insurer, finding that a 
wing-type para-plane was a "vehicle or device for aerial nav-
igation," an excluded risk. As to the plaintiff's argument 
that the exclusion was ambiguous because it failed to speci-
fically exclude accidents involving para-planes the court 
stated: 
-4-
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559 
Of course, the policy could have specifically named 
every known or conceivable type of device for aerial 
navigation had the company chosen to do so, but such 
specificity is not necessary when the general term, 
by its common and ordinary meaning, clearly includes 
the device in question. 
1 S.W.2d at 654. 
Other appellate courts which have examined the exclusion-
ary language at issue have uniformly held it to be nonambig-
uous. The most recent decision in point is Edison v. Reli-
able Life Ins. Co., 664 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir. 1981), in which 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of 
the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Washington, 495 F.Supp. 484, (discussed in appellant's open-
ing brief at pp. 12-14). On appeal the Ninth Circuit held 
that the exclusionary language was clear and unambiguous, and 
that the defendant insurer was entitled to summary judgment 
since the deceased had died as a consequence of riding in a 
•device for aerial navigation,• a parachute. 664 F.2d at 
1132. In finding the death was specifically excluded from 
coverage by the policy terms the court of appeals declined 
lThe test requires that the words be given their usual 
and natural meanings. The plaintiff's argument, however, 
relies on technical definitions from the Federal Aviation 
Agency and other sources which, even if accepted, do not 
illustrate any ambiguity. Brief of Respondent, pp. 7-8. 
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to •obscure the intentions of the parties to the policy under 
the guise of interpretation.• Id. at 1133. 
POINT II 
A WATER SKI KITE IS NOT DISTINGUISHABLE IN 
OPERATION FROM PARACHUTES, HANG GLIDERS, 
AND SIMILAR DEVICES SO AS TO REMOVE IT FROM 
THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE POLICY EXCLU-
SION. 
The plaintiff admits the water ski kite is used for rec-
reational purposes, can be very dangerous to fly, and is con-
trolled as to its movement in the air by the operator. Brief 
of Respondent, pp. 2-5. Nevertheless, the plaintiff contends 
the water ski kite is distinguishable from similar aerial 
devices such as hang gliders and parachutes. 
The plaintiff's attempts to distinguish the operation of 
the water ski kite from other similar devices rely on incon-
sistent analysis. In the lower court, the plaintiff analo-
gized the water ski kite to a parachute in purpose and 
function; the plaintiff's own affidavit likens the kite to a 
parachute. [R. 49, 52]. On appeal, the plaintiff now argues 
that a water ski kite is not like a parachute, but is a 
•water surface device•. 2 Brief of Respondent, p. 8. 
2The plaintiff makes no attempt to explain or justify 
this sudden change of face. Apparently, the plaintiff now 
realizes that parachute cases are regularly cited to define 
•aerial devices• and •navigation• (Brief of Respondent, p. 
14), and that the broad scope of the exclusionary language 
forces her to take to the water to prevail. 
-6-
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The plaintiff also contends that the kite is distinguish-
able from other similar devices on the basis that its move-
ment does not depend upon the reaction of air currents or its 
lifting surfaces. Brief of Respondent, p. 8. That statement 
is not supported in the record, and is contrary to the affi-
davit of Lynn Webb, manufacturer of the kite, which is a part 
of the record. [R. 31-33]. 
The operation of the water ski kite is not distinguish-
able from parachutes, hang gliders and similar devices in any 
meaningful way which would justify placing the kite outside 
the parameters of the policy exclusion and its intended pur-
pose. The risk sought to be excluded, recreational airborne 
travel, is the same for all of these devices. Notwithstand-
ing the plaintiff's appellation, the kite does not operate on 
the water surface but in the air. The kite has no fins or 
vertical sail. Its user must contend with birds, air cur-
rents and low-lying clouds, not fish, whitecaps and motorboat 
wakes. The kite is a •water surface device• used 50 feet 
above the water surface. Its operation is identical to a 
parachute or glider once the tow rope is disconnected. The 
boat does not control the kites maneuverability in the air, 
but simply extends its speed and range of travel. 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The dangers associated with sport kiting, hang gliding, 
parachuting and similar activities are well known. The in-
surance risk attendant upon such activities is the same. It 
is not reasonable that an average person familiar with these 
sports would view them as so distinguishable that the exclu-
sionary language affects risks attendant upon one activity 
but not another, nor that the exclusionary language was in-
tended to apply only to mechanical contrivances such as pri-
vately piloted airplanes and not to these non-mechanized de-
vices. The clear purpose and intent of the policy language 
is otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
There is not a single reported decision anywhere in the 
country supporting the plaintiff's argument that the policy 
exclusion at issue is ambiguous. Similarly, no basis or 
authority exists for distinguishing the operation of the 
water ski kite from parachutes, hang gliders and similar 
devices, with respect to the intended coverage and purpose of 
the aerial navigation exclusion. 
The intent of the policy exclusion is to eliminate from 
coverage the extra risks of death normally associated with 
the dangers of all aerial flight other than commercial trans-
portation. The scope of the exclusion is, intentionally, 
-8-
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very broad. That fact, however, has no bearing on this 
case. A broad exclusion is permissible so long as it is not 
ambiguous. The exclusionary language in question has been 
uniformly upheld as non-ambiguous by the courts. In addi-
tion, all courts which have considered the issue have uni-
formly held that devices of this type fall within the param-
eters of the exclusionary language. 
DATED this 23~d day of September, 1982. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
ByE~'{~ 
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